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1 Introduction
Proponents of ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) argue that policy designs that take
a more holistic view of marine ecosystems and affront their real world complexity will more ef-
fectively meet management goals.1 Researchers are addressing added complexity with the help
of computer-based ecosystem process models, hereafter, EPM’s (see review below). EPM’s can
track numerous ecosystem components, such as multiple fish species and marine mammal popula-
tions, spatial and temporal habitat variation, varying temperature, chemical composition, and water
salinity and currents, and competing anthropogenic uses of ecosystem resources, among other fac-
tors, across space and time at fine spatial-temporal scale. EPM’s are used to simulate outcomes
of stakeholder interest across competing management scenarios and varying model specifications.2
Simulation may assist managers and stakeholders in identifying and quantifying ecological and eco-
nomic tradeoffs implicit in a specific management action, thus leading to improved EBFM policy
designs.
Fishing mortality is the principal determinant of stock abundance across species, space, and time
in most marine ecosystems. It is therefore essential that models of the fishing sector be integrated
into EPM’s, and that these models generate a robust and unbiased characterization of fisheries-
ecosystem interaction. It has become common practice when building the EPM fishery sector com-
ponent to: (1) adopt restrictive and empirically unsupported assumptions for fishing technologies;
(2) assume fishermen employ myopic, ad hoc decision rules when conducting fishing operations;
(3) ignore the role of regulations and market clearing conditions that constrain fishery outcomes
and, due to a pervasive and unresolved identification problem in bioeconomic fisheries analysis; (4)
rely on empirically unverifiable theories of the crucial stock effect property of fishing technologies
when predicting/simulating bioeconomic outcomes. Throughout this paper I will refer to assump-
tions/practices (1)-(4) as the standard fishing sector assumptions, and fishing sector components of
EPM’s that utilize assumptions (1)-(4) as standard fishing models. This paper evaluates the validity
1EBFM is described in Patrick and Link (2015) as one that “Recognizes the combined physical, biological, economic
and social tradeoffs for managing the fisheries sector as an integrated system, specifically addresses competing objectives
and cumulative impacts to optimize the yields of all fisheries in an ecosystem.” See also NMFS, 2016.
2See Punt et al., 2016 for a review of a practice known as management strategy evaluation that simulates the entire
fisheries management process wherein EPM’s and submodels of the fisheries sector component play a crucial role.
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of standard fisheries models and proposes and implements an alternative rational expectations model
of multiple-species fishing under a real world regulatory constraint that address the shortcomings.
Standard fishing models score low on a criteria of ecological validity (i.e., the extent to which
the assumed setting approximates the real world) with regard to multiple-species fishing technolo-
gies and the role of regulations in a decentralized production setting. I show how missing elements
of real world decision making by commercial fishing operations can obtain a misleading characteri-
zation of fishing outcomes. Predictions derived under restrictive standard assumptions confound bi-
ological and economic forces into a reduced form effect that cannot predict fishing sector outcomes
under changing model fundamentals, such as regulations, dockside prices, and stock abundance.
Moreover, reliance on ad hoc rules to describe and predict fishing behavior ignores shadow prices
that are key drivers of fishing outcomes in regulated fisheries. Lastly, in lieu of the missing stock
effect property, common practice inserts a conceptual stand in for the stock effect property of the
fishing technology. Predictions of fishing behavior derived under this stand in approach may offer
heuristic description of possible behavior and outcomes but are void of empirical content.
Singh and Weninger (2018), hereafter SW, study rational ecological-economic equilibrium fish-
ing outcomes in a decentralized multiple-species commercial fishery that exhibits spatial- and temporal-
heterogeneity across both ecological and economic dimensions. SW relax several of the standard
model assumptions. This paper implements an abbreviated version of the approach empirically to
the US Gulf of Mexico (GOM) commercial reef fish fishery. The paper makes several contributions.
First, I highlight and contrast ecological validity in the SW versus the standard fisheries mod-
els in the context of a major US fishery. Following Weninger et al., (2019) I estimate a flexible
multiple-species harvesting technology under which commercial reef fish fishermen are assumed
to engage in costly, endogenous targeting of individual reef fish species. This step generalizes the
fixed output proportions assumption popular in standard models, e.g., the F-cube model of Ulrich
et al. (2008, 2009). The calibration demonstrates the importance of estimating the deep structural
properties of fishing technologies (among other model components). Results contrast the effects
of the endogenous targeting decisions of GOM reef fish fishermen which, I show become masked
within the ubiquitous catchability coefficients in standard harvest function specifications (Gordon,
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1954; Schaefer, 1954; see additional discussion in section 2).
Second, the application to the GOM reef fish fishery demonstrates the implications of adopting
ad hoc behavioral assumptions and utilizing naive prediction of fishery sector outcomes in bioe-
conomic fisheries analysis. Ad hoc behavioral rules are easily incorporated into computer-based
EPM’s. Fishing effort allocation rules, for example, can be specified as a simple functions of con-
temporaneous or lagged model elements such as stock abundance and/or landings prices. On the
contrary, deriving rational expectations equilibrium fishing outcomes under a quota regulation re-
quires solution of a multi-state variable dynamic programming problem. The approach I implement
is data intensive and computationally demanding. My analysis and results show, however, that the
payoff in terms of improved model validity can be substantial.
The application to the GOM reef fish demonstrates these gains. I estimate equilibrium fishing
outcomes, including regional-temporal quota utilization, landings and discards across individual
reef fish species, fleet revenue, cost, and quota rent, and importantly, the equilibrium (fishery wide)
quota trading prices, or regulatory shadow prices that govern rational equilibrium fishing activity.
Equilibrium outcomes are derived under varying total annual quotas, under a simulated region-wide
fishery closure, and under changing factor input prices. The results address, quantitatively, a key
question for GOM fishery managers and stakeholders, how will changes in annual quotas, closures,
and other economic fundamentals change regional harvests, landings, crew employment, and fishing
sector profits?
A third contribution of the paper is to highlight a currently unresolved empirical limitation of
fisheries bioeconomic models. Ekervold and Gordon (2013) and Weninger et al., (2019) show how
unobservability of the in situ fish stock creates an empirical identification problem that precludes
estimation of the fishing stock effect, i.e., the structural property of harvest technologies that de-
termines the productivity of allocated factor inputs (fishing effort). Absent knowledge of this key
driver of fishing behavior, it is impossible to predict fishing sector response to changing abundance.
Bioeconomic models thus lack external validity in the realm in which they are most often used to
inform policy design. Until methods to defensibly calibrate stock effects emerge, simulations us-
ing standard fishery sector models are likely to mislead policy designs. The problem may be more
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pronounced in multiple-species settings. My application to the GOM reef fish fishery makes clear
which aspects of fishing behavior are consistently calibrated, and thus external valid. The exercise
highlights the limitations of simulation exercises in the context of EBFM.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys some popular EPM’s and
further highlights the prevalence and role of standard assumption (1)-(4) introduced above. Section
3 presents the main elements of SW model. Section 4 presents the application to the GOM com-
mercial reef fish fishery. Data and accompanying estimation challenges/limitations are indicated.
Section 5 reports results from an abbreviated policy evaluation exercise emphasizing the role of the
GOM quota regulation in the determination of equilibrium fishing outcomes. Section 6 summarizes
my main findings and discusses future directions to further advance EBFM.
2 Background
In this section briefly reviews methods currently used to implement EBFM with particular focus on
the structure and integration of the fishery sector model components.3 A necessarily informal as-
sessment of model validity follows. I use the term ecological validity to describe the extent to which
a model approximates the real world setting that is being studied. Internal validity references the
ability of a model and empirical calibration to identify a causal factor in the presence of confounding
forces/factors. External validity refers to the property by which a calibrated model or key behav-
ioral driver can be used to predict outcomes outside of a particular environmental-economic setting.
Finally, I to describe the common practice of relying on the theoretical but empirically untestable
components of standard fisheries models in lieu of their consistently calibrated counterparts.
Ecosystem process models
Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) combines ecosystem trophic mass balance analysis with a dynamic
modeling capability for exploring past and future impacts of fishing and environmental disturbances
(Christensen and Walters, 2004). The model user can specify either the species-specific fishing mor-
tality rate or utilize a Fleet and Effort Dynamics module to predict fishing mortality across species,
3A comprehensive survey of ecosystem process models is available in Plaga´nyi (2007) and Prellezo et al. (2010).
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space, and time. The Fleet and Effort module utilises a primal model of the fishing technology with
user specified rules for effort allocation, and investment/divestment in fleet-specific effort capacity.4
The mix of harvested species in the model is determined exogenously by the species composition
of fish stock in the period and location in which harvesting takes place. The model accommodates
heterogeneous fishermen whose effort allocations respond differently to spatial-temporal economic
incentives, which are operationalized as fishing income differentials.5
Atlantis (Fulton et al., 2007) includes a “Socioeconomic Model” module of commercial fishing
fleet behavior that tracks monthly, yearly and spatial fishing effort allocations, landings, and profits
across multiple species, subfleets (defined as separate gear types), space, and time.6 Fishing effort,
which is operationalized as days fishing, is allocated to high expected profit opportunities at an
exogenously determined rate which is specified by the model user. The socioeconomic module
determines an “Annual Effort Plan” for individual subfleets under various assumptions for the role
of regulations, dockside fish prices, fleet investment, and quota trading. The plan allocates effort
proportionally to expected profits, which are assumed proportional to expected harvests. Empirical
calibration generally uses naive prediction e.g., expected harvest in month t is estimated from month
t − 1 outcomes. The Atlantis socioeconomic module includes additional submodules to predict
investment and divestment in vessel capital using ad hoc investment rules.
Atlantis evaluates fishing activity either directly or indirectly. An example of a direct approach
sets spatial-temporal harvests to a level chosen by the model user. The model can simulate fish stock
dynamics under different fishing intensities, and/or spatial-temporal fishing patterns. The indirect
approach relies on the predictions of the socioeconomic module that constructs the annual effort
4The fisheries management and economics literatures often use days at sea to proxy for the factors of production that
are allocated to fish harvest. In this approach, assumptions are added to limit total days at sea (capacity) during a specified
calendar period.
5EwE includes an optimization routine to predict spatial-temporal, species-specific fishing mortality rates that maxi-
mize a user-specified management objective function. Christensen and Walters (2004) offer, as an example, an objective
that maximizes the weighted sum of (1) the logarithm of the net present value of fishing profits earned, (2) the existence
value of the biomass stock and (3) a variance measure to penalize uncertainty about predictions that involve large devia-
tions from the Ecopath baseline (the idea here is to caution the user against selecting policies that lead to extreme, relative
to the Ecopath baseline, net present value and biomass outcomes).
6In an application of the Atlantis model to the GOM, Ainsworth et al. (2015) specifies 66 distinct spatial polygons,
and considers time steps as small as 12 hours. Atlantis utilizes age cohort models to track abundance of vertebrate
populations.
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plan, coupled with periodic updates/adjustments that respond to unforeseen changes in economic
conditions. The annual effort plan is re-evaluated monthly and adjustments are made based on
unforeseen contingencies, e.g., if actual cumulative catches have fallen below a planned benchmark,
effort levels can be increased.
FishRent (Salz et al., 2011) is a computer-based bioeconomic model designed to assess poten-
tial resource rents in a multiple-species and multiple-fleet-segment fishery over multiple time pe-
riods. FishRent combines several modules − Biological, Policy, Interface, Economic, Behavioral,
and Price − to track components of the fishery environment. Fishrent simulates biological and eco-
nomic outcomes under a set of starting conditions for a user-supplied parameterization of the model.
The Economic module tracks total catches, revenues and costs across multiple species and fleet
segments. The Behavior module contains an investment/divestment function that tracks/predicts
changes in fleet size.
The Policy module of FishRent allows the user to vary regulations between input and output
controls. Input controls limit the quantity of fishing effort, defined as fleet-segment days at sea, that
are allocated during each production period. Output controls take the form of a species-specific total
allowable catch (TAC) regulation. An option within the Policy module allows the user to increase
the resource exploitation intensity by adjusting annual TACs above or below a maximum sustainable
yield benchmark.
Per-period harvest of individual species is determined by a user-parameterized Cobb-Douglas
production (harvest) function. Harvest of each species by each fleet segment is a function of the
segments total effort allocation and the species-specific stock abundance. If harvest of one or more
species exceeds its respective TAC, the excess catch is assumed discarded. The decision problem
for mock fishing industry participants is a choice of how many capital units to allocate to each fleet
sector and the number of days at sea to operate each capital unit. Capital investment is assumed to
follow a myopic rule whereby capital enters (exits) at a user-specified rate when returns to capital
are positive (negative).
The FishRent model assumes that days at sea are controlled directly by regulation (under the
input control policy option). If an output based regulation is selected, the model inverts the Cobb-
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Douglas harvest function to identify the days required to harvest the allowable catch.7
DISPLACE (Bastardie, et al., 2013) is an agent-based bioeconomic fisheries model. A strength
of agent-based models is the ease with which individual decision heterogeneity, along almost any
dimension deemed important by the model user, can be incorporated. Bastadie, et al., 2013, consider
individual vessels that differ in terms of fishing power or productivity. An application in Bastardie,
et al., 2014, simulates the effects of various behavioral/management scenarios, including a fish-
erman’s decision to “Reduce the vessel speed”, “Choose a port closer to the fishing grounds” and,
“Displace effort toward a high expected profit area.” Model structure and assumptions, relationships
between key variables, parameter values, and the initial conditions must be specified by the model
user. Flexibility with regard to spatial and temporal resolution is virtually unlimited, as is the set of
policy options that might be evaluated.
The Fleets and Fisheries Forecast model, or F-cube, (Ulrich et al. 2008, 2009) is designed
for the evaluation and management of “mixed fisheries” a term used in the fisheries management
literature to describe fisheries in which multiple species are concurrently harvested by a particular
gear type.8 F-cube assumes fishing mortality is proportional to allocated fishing effort, e.g., days
or hours fishing. The model allows the scale and mix of per unit effort catch to vary across me´tiers
which partition commercial fishing operations into relatively homogeneous subsegments, with the
goal of simplifying the analysis of heterogeneous commercial fishing activity.
TEMAS (technical management measures) is a fleet-based bioeconomic software model de-
signed for simulation of short and long term bioeconomic outcomes in multiple-species fisheries
(see Ulrich et al., (2007)). The model adopts the fixed output proportions assumption and allows for
“flexibility of fishers to adopt their activity to changes in resources, management, and market condi-
tions.” Fishing effort allocations and capital investment decisions are predicted by a fleet adaptation
module that allocates effort based on spatially heterogeneous cost structures, prices, and manage-
ment. The fleet behavior module’s is operationalized (see Ulrich et al., 2007) using naive predictors
where fishing effort is assumed allocated based on differences in “the average value per unit of effort
7Documentation claims that the FISHRENT model can be used “to determine optimum value of resource rent and
other variables.” It is not clear to me how this feature operates.
8The consonant term from the production economics literature is a joint-in-inputs technology.
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during a previous time step (as proxy for economic attractiveness of alternate choices), and infor-
mation on the fleet’s fishing pattern during the previous time step (as proxy for recent knowledge)
and one year earlier (as proxy for seasonality and tradition).”
In sum, two key commonalities arise in fishery sector models: (1) restrictive assumptions for
the structure of the multiple-species harvest technology in the form of fixed output proportions and
(2) use of user-specified and ad hoc rules to characterize fishing behavior which are commonly
estimated by naive prediction, i.e., next period behavior will be equal to last period behavior. I next
argue that robust prediction of commercial fishing outcomes in complex and decentralized fishery
environments requires less restrictive assumptions for multiple-species harvesting technologies and
adoption of rational decision rules that are consistent with regulatory instruments used to manage
real world fisheries.
2.1 Standard assumptions: validity and other attributes
Multiple species fishing technologies
Representations of commercial fishing technologies are rooted in the early work of H. Scott Gordon
(1954) and Schaefer (1954) (see Hannesson (1983) for a review). The ubiquitous Gordon-Schaefer
(G-S) single-species harvest function takes the form, h = qEX , where h denotes the harvest quan-
tity, q is a scaling parameter known as the catchability coefficient which measures the proportion
of the stock, X , that is harvested per unit of the (scalar) factor input, E, known as fishing effort.
Harvest functions map physical quantities of factor inputs to physical quantities saleable output; E
is in fact a composite of multiple factors of production, e.g., vessel capital services, crew labor, fuel,
nets, hooks, bait, and electronic equipment used on board, miscellaneous supplies, etc. utilized in
harvesting operations. In applications, fishing effort is often measured with input proxies such as
the number of boats in a fishery, days fishermen spend at sea (which assumes physical quantities
flow in proportion to time), or as a consistent aggregate index of the array of factor inputs allocated
(Squires, 1987). The implications of using proxies to measure effort is not a focus of this paper. I
instead consider the role of the G-S harvest model for characterizing and predicting the behavior of
multiple-species fishermen.
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Extensions of the G-S framework to the case of multiple-species has followed two paths. The
first assumes a technology that is nonjoint in inputs (e.g., Flaaten, 1991). Nonjointness implies the
existence of species-specific harvest functions, e.g., hi = qiEiXi, where i indexes individual fish
species. Under the nonjoint property, fishermen are assumed able to direct fishing effort toward the
production of a single fish species (observe the subscript notation, Ei). This specification rules out
public factors of production, i.e., capital, labor, nets and hooks are assumed allocatable to a single
targeted fish species. Importantly, the non-joint assumption implies that the choice of species i har-
vest can be made independently of the input/harvest choice for other species. This characterization
of multiple-species harvesting is not supported empirically (Branch and Hilborn, 2008; Weninger et
al., 2019) or conceptually (Abbott et al., 2015; Ulrich et al., 2017).
A second extension of the G-S harvest model to multiple-species takes the form,
~h = ~qE ~X, (1)
where above-arrows have been added to distinguish vectors with dimension equal to the number of
species under consideration. The specification in 1 assumes the technology is joint-in-inputs and
exhibits fixed output proportions. Note that the effort variable is specified as a scalar.
Fixed output proportions assumes that fishermen do not control the mix of species that are
intercepted by their gear while fishing. Equation (1) is consistent with behavior wherein fisher-
men organize factor inputs to form the effort composite input independently of the mix of species
they harvest, and independently of the level and mix of the species’ stocks. The internal struc-
ture/organization of E may vary with factor input prices, although rarely are prices included in its
measurement.9
Under the technology in equation (1) the mix of harvested species is determined by the exoge-
nous stock abundance vector. The model rules out targeting of individual species. With no control
over the mix of harvested species, the specification in (1) assumes that fishermen either stop fishing
9Primal models of multiple-species fishing technologies have additional limitations. Multi-output production func-
tions or transformation functions can be formed only if the technology exhibits the property of strong (also called free)
output disposability (Diewert, 1973). Turner (1995) and Singh and Weninger (2009) show that the free output disposabil-
ity property is inconsistent with the pervasive problem of bycatch and discarding in commercial fisheries.
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when an individual species quota binds, or continue to fish (apply effort) and discard the overage of
the binding quota species catch.
The me´tier adaptation of (1) is more general in that is allows the harvest species mix to vary
across gear types and/or the spatial region of fishing. The model maintains the fixed output propor-
tions assumption within me´tiers. Let k = 1, . . . ,K index a finite set of me´tiers. The F-cube model
assumes the decision problem for fishermen is involves two choices (in addition to the formation of
the effort aggregate); fishermen first choose the me´tier(s) in which they operate and then choose the
quantity of effort, Ek, applied to each. Discarding behavior follows as above.
Harvest outcomes under the G-S model are determined by the effort choice and the catchability
coefficient ~qk for me´tier k. To demonstrate the crucial role of this parameter for prediction in
bioeconomic models, it is instructive to review a typical application/calibration of equation (1). Ono
et al., 2018 build an EPM of the BSAI multiple species groundfish fishery with the goal of evaluating
alternate management strategies. The model presented includes a fish population dynamics module,
a fleet harvesting/dynamics module, and a module to predict quota allocations across heterogeneous
users of the groundfish resource. The goal is evaluation and prediction of fishing and biological
outcomes under alternate regulatory scenarios.10
Ono et al., 2018, define a me´tier as a “group of fishing operations targeting a specific assemblage
of species using a specific gear, at a specific time and in a specific area.” Onboard observer data
across a 5 year data period (2010-14) that recorded species composition at the level of a vessel
trawl tow is used in a cluster analysis to identify a set of me´tiers. Note that the data used in this
exercise proxies for ~hn/En in equation (1) where the n subscript indexes observations in the data.
It should be emphasized that the data are generated by individual fishermen operating in different
regions at different dates within the 2010-14 data period. Clusters, or me´tiers, are identified through
similarity in observed groundfish catch composition. Importantly, the groundfish stock abundance
in the regions and time periods of the data is unobserved by the researcher.
For expositional purposes denote qˆk as the estimated catchability vector for me´tier k = 1, . . . ,K
10The scenarios investigated in the paper include competing assumptions for the harvest control rule used to set annual
quotas, changes in a target species and a bycatch species quota, a change in the structure of the fishing technology and
accompanying fishing behavior, and a change in the information available to the regulator when setting annual quotas.
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(notation differs slightly in Ono et al., 2018 application). Conditional on the identification of K,
~qk, for k = 1, . . . ,K is calibrated from historical catch data (see also Hoff et al., 2010; Sølgaard
Andersen, et al., 2010; many others that apply similar methods). Under the implicit assumptions of
the model in (
refGS Multiple) the estimates of ~qk derived from historical data will embody the unobserved stock
conditions during the data period. Extrapolating ~qk estimates to different stock conditions requires
additional assumptions as recognized by the authors.
Recall that the G-S characterization of multiple-species fishing behavior does not include en-
dogenous targeting if distinct fish species. If endogenous targeting is a possibility, the internal and
the external validity of the G-approach will be low. To appreciate this point, contrast the G-S char-
acterization of fishing behavior with behavior implied in a model of flexible, costly targeting in a
multiple-species fishery.
Singh and Weninger (2009, 2018), Weninger et al. (2019), and the results presented below (see
also Branch and Hilborn, 2008; Abbott et al., 2015) assume fishermen influence the mix of species
that are intercepted and harvested by their gear. For example, adjusting the micro-locations of fish-
ing, the depths of gear deployment, time of day that gear is set, the type of gear and bait used, among
other possibly subtle behaviors, alters the “catchability” of fishing gear. Such endogenous targeting
actions are assumed driven by economic motives such as profit maximization. Under the flexible
costly targeting assumption realized harvest at the trip level or over a discrete calendar period be-
comes an endogenous choice that depends jointly on economic and regulatory fundamentals such as
fish and fuel prices, and annual catch limits, and on the abundance and composition of the multiple-
species fish stock that is exploited. In this production setting, and acknowledging that space and
time are continuous as most likely are stock conditions, catchability is a continuous property of the
multiple-species technology, or in other words, the number of possible me´tiers, K, is infinite. Per-
haps the most important point of contrast is that with flexible and endogenous targeting, the implicit
catchability of individuals species becomes a complex function of all model fundamentals includ-
ing the management policy and regulations that are the focus of the bioeconomic analysis.11 Policy
11 Singh and Weninger (2009, 2018) present necessary conditions for profit maximizing factor input choices, harvest
choices and at-sea discards which occur under specific technological and regulatory conditions.
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recommendations derived under the restrictive G-S assumptions, if they do not hold, will exhibit
low external validity.
Stark differences in implied decision making processes and model calibration methodology ex-
ist between the G-S specification and the flexible, costly targeting model of SW. However, unob-
servability of the in situ fish stock negates empirical test of competing models. The internally and
external validity of competing models is thus unknowable. It should be emphasized further that
the effect of changes in stock abundance and species mix on the productivity of effort in the G-S
framework, and on harvest costs in the SW model cannot be empirically identified when the stock
is unobserved. Thus, bioeconomic simulation to predict fishing behavior under changing stock con-
ditions may be particularly unreliable. I return to this issue below.
Weninger et al., (2019) introduce a parametric functional form and a strategy to estimate a trip
level cost function that captures the structural properties of jointness and weak output disposability
(costly targeting) when spatial-temporal stock conditions are unobserved by the researcher. The
approach is used below to consistently calibrate key aspects of the GOM reef fish harvesting tech-
nology and address several important questions related to management design.
Regulations
Commercial fishing takes place in a decentralized production environment; a manager/regulator sets
rules by which harvesting operations can legally proceed; autonomous agents (fishermen) carry out
harvesting operations to address privately optimal objectives. Regulations limit fishing mortality to
what are deemed sustainable levels. Historically, regulations have restricted factors of production
that are allocated to the fishery or imposed constraints on production practices, e.g., limits on num-
bers of participating vessels and their size, gear restrictions, spatial and/or temporal fishery closure,
vessel trip catch or landings limits. More recently output control approaches including individual
transferable quotas (ITQs) which grant a right to harvest a specified quantity of fish during a set
production period, usually a single calendar year, have become popular. An ITQ regulation places
a bound on seasonal harvests, or landings in the case where at-sea vessel monitoring is absent.
ITQs do not force fishermen to harvest the entire quota, nor do they dictate where across the fishing
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ground, or when within the regulatory cycle harvests occur.
Regulations are constraints on harvesting operations. Such constraints effectively change, de-
pending on their specific form, the implicit prices that harvesters face when organizing production.
The ability to predict fishing behavior in a regulated production setting hinges critically on un-
derstanding the private economic objectives of fishermen and incorporating the correct regulatory
shadow prices into fishing behavioral models.
Input-control regulations alter prices of the factors of production. For example, a regulation that
limits vessel length, if binding, will raise the effective price of vessel capital potentially leading a
profit maximizing fisherman to adjust all factor inputs and harvested outputs. An ITQ regulation
when binding introduces a virtual supply price, i.e., the price at which a profit maximizing fisherman
would supply a quota-constrained harvest vector if the constraint did not exist. Predicting behavior
of commercial multiple-species fishermen under an ITQ regulation thus requires calculation of these
virtual quota trading prices.
This principle applies to the red snapper and the grouper-tilefish ITQ regulations in the GOM
commercial reef fish fishery. Each year the regulator (with stakeholder input) sets species-specific
quotas that cap total landings of major reef fish species during a calendar year. All landings, by
species, must be matched against quota. Quota is freely tradeable. There are no spatial or within-
season restrictions on quota use except to protect sea turtles. Commercial fishermen decide when
and where species-specific quota is utilized. Discarding fish at sea is neither prohibited or observed
by the regulator and discards do not need to be matched against quota.
To characterize and predict outcomes in a decentralized fishery, SW assume commercial fisher-
men are rational economic agents who choose factor inputs, harvests and discards by species, and
within-season quota purchases/leases with the goal of maximizing their private single-season profit.
Fishermen are assumed to have full knowledge of the ecological-economic environment in which
harvesting operations take place, i.e., they understand the ecological, economic, and regulatory
forces and the decision making of all GOM commercial fishermen. Ecological-economic equi-
librium outcomes correspond to the privately optimal choices of all fishermen throughout the full
regulatory cycle. Equilibrium stock conditions are determined jointly with equilibrium economic
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choices.
It is again instructive to contrast the rational behavioral assumption of SW with the assumptions
of standard fishery models. Note that a rational seasonal profit maximizing fishermen must plan the
entire season’s harvesting operations such that no adjustments to factor input use or redistribution of
quota utilization across space or within-season can increase seasonal profit. Because quota is freely
tradeable, this profit maximization condition extends to the level of the entire reef fish fleet. The
solution to the fishermen’s problem will depend on all fundamentals: the available technology, fish
and factor input prices, and spatial-temporal stock abundance.
A common behavior rule used to characterize and predict fishing behavior in standard model
are that fishermen are myopic and follow ad hoc rules such as “effort is allocated across regions and
species in response to profit opportunities at rates set by the model user. Profit opportunities one
period ahead are typically assumed equal to current profit opportunities. Seasonal quota constraints
or other regulatory constraints may be included but in ad hoc ways, e.g., fishing stops when the
quota for the most valuable species in the multiple-species complex has been landed by the fleet.
Fishing patterns predicted by standard model do not adhere to the seasonal profit maximization
objective or other directed objective, thus the label, ad hoc. For example, the module determining
the seasonal effort allocation in Atlantis adjusts the rate of effort allocated if it appears that quota
constraints will be met too early or too late in the season. The implication is that the initial rate
of effort application was incorrect. One problem with the ad hoc approach is there are an infinite
number of early season effort allocation rates and within season adjustments that could be inserted
into a standard model, each of which will generate a different prediction of spatial-temporal fishing
outcomes. The choice of a particular beginning season effort allocation rate becomes arbitrary, and
in practice is estimated from past data.
Stock effects
A central purpose of EPM development and fisheries sector modeling is to predict and evaluate
outcomes of interest to stakeholders under alternative management policies. Internal and external
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model validity are crucial for this endeavor.12 Assessing and achieving internal validity in bioeco-
nomic fisheries models is complicated by missing or imprecise measures of stock abundance. The
problem is illustrated simply in the context of the G-S harvest model, equation (1).
Notice that the fish stock the catchability coefficient, fishing effort and stock abundance enter
multiplicatively in equation (1). Suppose that cost expenditure data exist so that a consistent index
of fishing effort can be formed (Squires, 1987). The G-S harvest model includes two unobserved
components, {~q,X}. The catchability coefficient maps abundance to the productivity of fishing
effort and is therefore the key driver of the effort allocation decision. If X changes, the quantity of
effort chosen by the profit maximizing fishermen must also be expected to change. The parameter
~q determines the magnitude of effort adjustment. Precise knowledge of the parameter ~q is therefore
crucial for predicting fishing sector response to changing stock abundance. Weninger et al., 2019
show how unobservability of absolute and relative species stock abundance prevents identification
of the stock effect structural property of a multiple-species fishing technology.
Unobservability of the in situ fish stock further precludes statistical testing of the internal va-
lidity of the harvest model. This problem is made concrete by contrasting the standard and SW
assumptions for the structure of multiple-species technologies. Under the fixed output proportions
assumption (equation 1 and Fcube), variation in catch composition that is observed in data is at-
tributed, solely, to variation in the species mix, conditional on factors that distinguish me´tiers, e.g.,
gear, space, date of season. Under the costly targeting technological assumptions of SW, variation
in observed catch composition is assumed to vary with the profit maximizing targeting choices of
fishermen, and thus potentially all model fundamentals including dockside fish prices, factor in-
put prices, the scale and scope properties of the technology, regulations, as well as the spatially-
and temporally- (continuously) varying fish stock. Absent data on spatial-, temporal- and species-
specific abundance, formal testing for the true cause of observed catch is not possible. It is not
surprising therefore that a consensus as to which technological specification is appropriate in anal-
yses of multiple-species fisheries has not emerged.
12Shmueli (2010) compares statistical methods in the context of different scientific objectives of either explaining and
predicting economic phenomenon. See Ferraro et al., (2018) for a discussion of causal inference in coupled human and
natural systems.
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If the stock effect property cannot be estimated, how does EPM simulation proceed? The miss-
ing stock effect property is commonly replaced with additional assumptions often which derive from
the G-S harvest model. A recent application to a Bearing Sea Aleutian Island (BSAI) groundfish
fishery demonstrates.13 Ono et al., (2018) assume the me´tier specific catch composition is fixed
in the 2011-15 data that is available for analysis. Simulations of stock dynamics, TACs, catch by
me´tier are projected over a 15 year period in which annual recruitment is assumed given as a log-
normally distributed recruitment shock. The simulation therefore considered changes in absolute
abundance and species mix during the simulation. Predicting fishing behavior in this environment
thus requires knowledge of ground fishermen’s factor input allocation responses to absolute and rel-
ative groundfish abundance. In lieu of the missing stock effect property, Ono et al. (2018) assume
that the me´tier-specific catch of species i fish increases proportionally to relative abundance of the
(simulated) species i stock. This assumption is consistent with fixed output proportions technology
but is clearly ad hoc and cannot be tested or calibrated empirically.
A second concern in the simulation exercise is that shadow prices accompanying the BSAI
quota regulation are absent. In other words, predictions of fishing behavior responses generated
by the model are not disciplined by a directed behavioral objective for groundfish fishermen (e.g.,
profit-maximization) nor are they governed by the regulatory constraint under which groundfish
fishermen operate (see Fissel et al., 2016).
Summarizing, this section as argued that standard fisheries models lack ecological, internal, and
external validity, the latter problems arising in particular due to unobservability of fish stock abun-
dance at spatial and temporal scales typically specified in EBFM models. Unobserved abundance
further precludes measurement of the stock effect structural property of harvesting technologies
forcing reliance on circular ad hoc assumptions when predicting fishing behavioral outcomes under
changing stock conditions. The next sections relax the standard model assumptions and overcomes
several but not all of these limitations.
13The Ono et al., 2018 model is used to conduct, through simulation, management strategy evaluation that encompasses
various aspects of the actual fisheries management process. Four main model components are included: (i) a stock growth
model, (ii) a stock assessment model that utilizes a CPUE index and other data along with the stock model to estimate
abundance in year t, (iii) a management model that applies a harvest control rule to set year t+ 1 annual total allowable
catch by species and, (iv) a fleet dynamics model that predicts the year t+ 1 catch of each species for each me´tier.
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3 A model of rational multiple-species fishing
Let s index the spatial regions of the GOM fishing ground. Regions are delineated based on coarse
commonality in ecological habitat and presumed stock growth and economic characteristics, e.g.,
costs of accessing the resource from ports in each region, regional differences in habitat quality,
water depth, demand conditions, etc. Individual fish species are indexed with subscript ı = 1, . . . , I .
A region may support some or all species of reef fish in the multiple-species complex. I consider
a single representative calendar year which corresponds to a regulatory cycle, i.e., the period over
which aggregate quota is set by the regulator and utilized by the industry. I divide the year into
quarters which I index with subscript t. Stock and economic conditions can vary across (s, t)
combinations. I assume for simplicity that stock and economic conditions are fixed within (s, t)
pairs.
The regulator announces annual species-specific quotas prior to the commencement of harvest-
ing operations. Let Q¯ denote the I-vector of species-specific quotas. (To ease notation, above arrows
are no longer used to denote vectors.) The regulation caps the seasonal landings of each species.
There is no cheating in the model and therefore seasonal landings cannot exceed Q¯. The regulator
can only limit the landing, actual landings may fall below Q¯i for some i if it is not profitable to land
the entire species i quota. Consistent with the ITQ regulation in the GOM reef fish fishery, discard-
ing is not illegal and is unobserved by the regulator on most trips.14 Thus while the regulation caps
landings it does not limit at sea discards. Finally, there are no restrictions on the regions or date
that species i quota may be landed within the regulatory cycle; spatial-temporal quota utilization is
decided by industry.
I assume fishermen have access to a common harvesting technology. Per-trip harvest costs
depend on factor input prices, the quantity of reef fish harvested and the absolute and relative abun-
dance of individual reef fish species stocks within the region of fishing. The assumption of a com-
mon technology avoids the need to track individual fishing operations. I instead consider a repre-
sentative operation with technology given by the trip-level harvesting cost function c(hst, wst|Xst),
where wst denotes a vector of factor input prices and Xst denotes the stock abundance in region s
14Some trips carry on board observers to collect information used for management purposes.
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and quarter t. Notice that harvest costs are defined over the quantity of fish harvested, hst = lst+dst,
where lst ≥ 0 denotes landings and dst ≥ 0 discards. Harvest costs are assumed to be increasing
and convex in hst, and non-decreasing and concave in wst. The joint in inputs and weak output
disposability properties are assumed. The reader is referred to Weninger et al., (2019) for a detailed
discussion of the relationship between harvest costs and the multiple-species abundance, Xst.
I assume factor inputs are purchased competitively. Reef fish fishermen are further assumed to
be price takers at the dock. Prices for landed reef fish are assumed to depend on the total quantity
landed in a region during a subperiod. I use Ls,t to denote the I-vector of region s, quarter t
aggregate landings (all fishermen, all trips). The dockside fish price vector then follows p(Lt)
where p(·) is the inverse demand for landed fish.
I useKst to denote the number of fishing trips taken in region s and quarter t. Aggregate harvest
is denoted Hst = Lst +Dst.
I assume that quota trading is frictionless, i.e., there are no trading transactions costs.
A fishing vessel is appropriately viewed as a quasi-fixed factor of production. I however do not
model the capital investment decisions of reef fish fishermen. Many fisheries, including GOM reef
fish, are characterized by an oversized fishing fleet (see Weninger et al., 2019). I therefore assume
the capital embodied in the reef fish fleet is sufficient to accommodate a perfectly elastic supply of
fishing trips during a regulatory cycle. Finally, to simplify the model I assume that harvest, landing,
and discard choices are identical on each trip taken within each (s, t) pair.
Rational expectations equilibrium fishing
SW derive conditions for equilibrium species-specific quota utilization across species, space and
time. The allocation satisfies an intuitive condition wherein the marginal profit from utilizing a unit
of species i quota (landing a unit of species i fish) is equal across all trips and all (s, t) pairs. I solve
for this equilibrium in two steps.
The first step solves for the profit maximizing trips, and per-trip landings and discards, given
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prices, stock conditions, and quota in each (s, t) pair:
v(Xst, Qst) = max{K,l,d}
K
(
pst(L)l − c(l + d|wst, Xst)
)
. (2)
subject to,
KL ≤ Qst.
The problem in (2) must be solved for all feasible reef fish stock abundance and quota levels.
v(Xst, Qst) is thus a multivariate function of the state space which in the most general case in-
cludes I stocks and I quota quantities. Multivariate functional approximation methods are used to
approximate v() over its domain. Note that the domain of interest is bounded. Possible values of
the fish stock are determined from beginning season stock conditions and stock growth properties.
The quota available in (s, t) pairs, i.e., the quota that remains unfished at date t is bounded above
by the beginning season quota, which is determined by the model user.
The second step of the solution algorithm solves the (s, t) quota allocation problem:
V (X1, Q¯) = max{Qst}
4∑
t=1
4∑
s=1
v(Xst, Qst|s, t). (3)
Subject to,
4∑
t=1
4∑
s=1
Qst ≤ Q¯, (4a)
Xs,t+1 =G(Xt − Lt − λDt), (4b)
whereG(·) is the stock transition function that governs growth and spatial migration of the reef fish
stock. Abundance in region s and quarter t+ 1 is specified as a function of the period t escapement
across the entire fishery. Note that Xt = {Xst}Ss=1 is the I × S matrix of beginning quarter stock
levels, Lt = {Lst}Ss=1 denotes landings and λDt = {λDst}Ss=1 denotes dead discards, with λ
representing the discard mortality rate (vector conformability is assumed).15
15Observe that the solution to (2) also determines landings and discards at all values of the state space; Lt =
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4 Calibration and implementation
To implement the model I divide the GOM reef fish fishery into four regions: a WEST region ex-
tends from the Mexico border in west Texas to the Mississippi river delta; the AL-MS region extends
from the eastern Mississippi river delta to Cape San Blas, Florida (near Panama City, Florida). A
third northern Florida region (FL-North) extends from Cape San Blas south to roughly Fort Myers,
Florida. A fourth region (FL-South) is the Florida Key region.
Practical considerations require aggregation across some reef fish species. I form eight harvested
outputs based on regulations and the importance of individual species in commercial landings and
revenue. Species designations include: (1) red snapper; (2) vermilion snapper; (3) red grouper; (4)
gag grouper; (5) shallow water groupers, which included black grouper, scamp, yellowfin grouper,
and yellowmouth grouper; (6) deep-water groupers, which included snowy grouper, speckled hind,
warsaw grouper, and yellowedge grouper; (7) tilefish, which included blueline tilefish, golden tile-
fish and goldface tilefish; and an (8) Other species category which includes coastal pelagic species
(mackerel, tuna, and dolphin species) and all remaining reef fish species. Quantities in output groups
that consist of multiple fish species are formed as linear aggregates.
Four components of the model require calibration: (1) the dockside inverse fish demand func-
tion; (2) the trip-level harvest cost function; (3) stock growth transition equations; and (4) starting
values for model state variables, which include the beginning season abundance, by species and re-
gion, and the vector of annual quotas (a choice variable for the model user). Challenges involved in
calibrating stock growth and initial stock abundance are not discussed here. I focus on the estimation
of the fishing behavioral components, (1) and (2).16
Weninger et al., (2019) show that under reasonable assumptions for the form taken by the harvest
cost stock effect (even thought it is not estimated), absolute and marginal reef fish harvest costs
can be consistently estimated from trip-level harvest and expenditure data. The authors expose
why identification of reef fish stock effects across space and time require additional strong and
untestable assumptions. Absent a defensible estimate of the stock effect for reef fish, the analysis
L(XT , Qt) and Dt = D(XT , Qt). These relationship can be used in the second step of the solution algorithm to
determine fishing mortality and thus the spatial-temporal evolution of the fish stock.
16Note that the following is not a comprehensive guide to the econometric analysis of fisheries data.
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that is feasible is limited. The results I present below will be interpreted as “short run” scenarios
during which changes in the reef fish stock abundance are either assumed minimal, or assumed
to have minimal effects on reef fish harvest costs and thus fishing behavior. There is no way to
test this assumption. The results reported in the sequel are interpreted accordingly. Note that the
unmeasured stock effect property does not prevent use of the model to inform frequently asked
management questions as I demonstrate shortly.
Further empirical considerations
Aggregating across different gear types may mask differences in fishing technologies and behavior;
on the surface, disaggregation would appear to be a sensible empirical strategy. The trip cost func-
tional form I estimate includes shift parameters to accommodate potential cost differences among
longline and vertical line gear types. Note however that type of gear used by commercial fishermen
is an endogenous choice. Modeling gear choice decisions can further complicate fishing behavioral
models and will likely increase data requirements. The theory of quota regulated fishery production
requires all profit opportunities and thus cost efficiencies be exhausted in a quota trading equilibrium
(Singh and Weninger, 2018). I exploit this principle and focus my estimation on the cost function
for vertical line reef fishing gear, the most prevalent gear type in my data. The implicit assumption I
make is that all quota users, irrespective of gear type, must match the cost efficiency of vertical line
gear.
Fishing vessel capital is appropriately viewed as quasi-fixed, and specific factor of production.
The specificity label reflects the property wherein the value of a fishing boat when allocated to
a non-fishery use in the economy is likely to be discretely lower and may in fact be zero (Singh
et al., 2006). Vessel capital investment/divestment decisions are complicated by costly investment
reversibility and uncertainty in managed fisheries (deriving from random stock abundance and regu-
latory adjustements). A robust and well-calibrated model of capital investment is therefore difficult
to conceive, and is not attempted here.
22
Dockside fish demand
Estimates of GOM reef fish inverse demand are provided in Keithly Jr. and Tabarestani (2017).
Keithly Jr. and Tabarestani (2017) estimate a system of inverse demand equations for GOM red
snapper, red grouper, other grouper species, GOM and South Atlantic Dolphin, and three import
substitute species.
Own-price flexibility estimates are -0.725 for red snapper, -0.643 for red grouper, and -0.436
for other grouper species. Dolphin makes up an insignificant share of trip revenue in my data. I
assume therefor that the Dolphin dockside price is constant. Cross-price flexibility estimates for the
three reef fish species provided in Keithly Jr. and Tabarestani (2017). These estimates are small but
nonzero at conventional levels of statistical significance.
The demand analysis of Keithly Jr. and Tabarestani (2017) has implications for modeling fishing
behavior in multiple-species fisheries. First, nonzero price flexibilities imply that reef fish prices
vary with landings. Second, nonzero cross-price flexibilities suggest a potential source of harvest
interdependency across reef fish species that is often overlooked in multiple-species bioeconomic
fisheries models.
I adopt two simplifying assumptions in my application. First, I specify the dockside fish price
at each (s, t) combination as function of (s, t) landings only. The assumption here is that markets
for landed reef fish are independent across (s, t) pairs. Note that if this independence does not
hold, equilibrium dockside prices become a function of species-specific landings across all regions
and perhaps across multiple quarters. Such dependence would increase the dimension of the state
space of my model to unmanageable levels, e.g., with regional price interdependence, 2 × I × S
state variables determine price in each (s, t) and are thus relevant for solving the problem in (2). A
second assumption is that cross-species price effects at the regional level are zero. This latter as-
sumption further simplifies the model and importantly allows me to isolate the role of technological
interdependence in equilibrium fishing outcomes.
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Harvest costs and specification tests
My estimations of trip harvesting costs follow Weninger et al., (2019). Region-specific cost func-
tions are estimated using date from the 2005-14 harvest seasons. Trip level landings and cost are
obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) log book reporting system. Log book
records include trip start and end dates, landings by species, the quantity and type of gear deployed,
the primary region of fishing, the depth at which the bulk of the gear was deployed, the number of
crew on board, among other infromation (see Weninger et al., 2019 for additional details). A survey
of annual capital and fixed operating expenses conducted by the Southeast Fisheries Science Center
supplements the logbook data. Discard information is obtained from post trip surveys. The full data
set contains 21,491 observations; of these, 12,422 (57.8%) include harvesting cost information.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics at the level of individual fishing trips, and across the four
regions of the GOM. The table reports average values and standard deviations for trip characteristics
including days at sea, crew size, landings, revenue, variable costs, cost shares for individual factor
inputs, and species-specific revenue shares.
The descriptive statistics show regional variation across all trip characteristic. Differences in
factor input expenditure shares are small, but perhaps revealing of potential differences in the re-
gional reef fish harvesting costs. What is not apparent is the underlying cause of these costs differ-
ence. It is reasonable to expect that distance from ports within a region to the regions productive
fishing locations vary geographically. Such difference would impact fuel-harvest transformation
relationships. For example, a reef fish trip involves steaming from port to a chosen location where
the gear is deployed; no fish are harvested during the steaming portion of the trip. This suggests
further that a non-linear relationship between factor inputs deployed and harvest may exist, e.g., that
the fuel input-output transformation relationship is likely nonlinear. Estimation results confirm this
intuition.
Estimation of cost function structural properties are consistent with regional heterogeneity ex-
hibited in table 1. The fuel price-cost elasticity estimate is 0.66 in the WEST region, 0.28 in the
AL-MS region, 0.26 in the FL-North region, and 0.30 in the FL-South region of the fishery. The
crew wage cost elasticity estimate increases moving from the west to east regions from 0.30 in the
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WEST (N=2,742) AL-MS (N = 4,321) FL-North (N=3,438) FL-South (N=2,191)
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Days 4.11 3.50 3.85 2.78 5.18 3.60 2.88 3.24
Crew size 2.68 1.41 2.81 1.20 2.36 0.91 1.93 0.78
Landings 3,702.52 4,826.73 2,245.50 2,191.43 2,325.03 2,765.45 1,193.94 1,847.49
Revenue 11,349.60 16,565.01 6,261.29 6,723.64 7,076.53 8,988.60 3,315.28 5,576.92
Var. Cost 4,397.07 4,826.73 2,245.50 2,191.43 3,839.73 3,350.35 2,089.65 2,812.07
Labor exp. 2,192.04 2,589.76 1,944.11 1,690.35 2,216.56 1,871.93 1,160.19 1,578.04
Fuel exp. 856.86 896.56 604.49 583.43 631.13 539.45 375.46 465.45
Other exp. 1,195.84 1,568.03 829.13 1,009.56 858.00 1,070.73 480.04 824.28
Capital Exp. 148.65 217.88 124.79 178.27 134.04 144.85 73.96 117.72
Factor Expenditure Shares
Labor 0.51 0.12 0.57 0.12 0.59 0.11 0.57 0.14
Fuel 0.23 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.22 0.11
Other 0.23 0.11 0.20 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.11
Capital 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01
Revenue Shares by Species
Red snap. 0.36 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.09 0.17 0.01 0.05
Verm. snap. 0.10 0.20 0.32 0.33 0.04 0.12 <0.01 0.05
Red group. <0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.54 0.36 0.10 0.26
Gag group. <0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.12 0.19 0.01 0.05
OSW group. 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.10
DW group. 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.13
Tilefish 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.08 <0.01 0.03 0.01 0.09
Oth. spec. 0.49 0.47 0.28 0.38 0.16 0.32 0.85 0.37
Table 1: Regional Trip-level Cost and Revenue Descriptive Statistics.
Landings are reported in pounds. Revenues and expenses are reported in
$2014.
WEST to 0.51 in the FL-South.
Table 1 shows variation in species-specific revenue shares across regions. Red and vermilion
snapper account for 46% of trip revenue on average on WEST trips. In the AL-MS region, these
same two snapper species make up an even larger share, 58%, of average trip revenue due primarily
to large vermilion snapper harvests. Red and vermilion snapper comprise a small share of trip
revenue in the eastern GOM; 13% in FL-North, and roughly 1% in FL-South. Grouper species
combined account for roughly 5% of average trip revenue in the WEST. The combined grouper
share of trip revenue exceeds 70% in FL-North. Groupers account for roughly 17% of average trip
revenue in the FL-South region.
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It is instructive to examine the descriptive statistics in table 1 in context of a fixed output pro-
portions technology assumptions. A first question is whether fishing effort, which I measure as total
trip cost17 is linear in days at sea. I regress trip costs on days at sea entered in polynomial form.
These regressions soundly reject the linearity specification in all regions.
I next test the hypothesis that harvested pounds are linear in effort, measured either as days at
sea or as trip cost. For these regressions I select harvest shares of prominent species from each
region as the left hand side variable and, as above, consider linear and higher-order polynomials
of my effort measures as regressors. Linear specifications are soundly rejected for most reef fish
species across all regions. The linear in effort harvest function specification is not supported with
my data.
A question remains as to which technological assumptions, the fixed output proportions G-
S specification, or a flexible technology with endogenous targeting best characterizes the GOM
reef fish fishing technology? As noted, a formal test of competing assumptions is not possible
given unobservability of the reef fish stock. Considerable indirect evidence however supports the
flexible costly targeting assumption. Singh and Weninger (2017) find a strong link between catch
composition, trip level catch limit regulations and fishery closures. Weninger et al., (2019) link
reef fish catch composition to the economic targeting incentives implicit in the quota regulation.
Examination of the catch composition in my data, as reported in figure 1, further supports the
flexible technological specification.
Figure 1 shows a box and whisker plot of quarterly average per trip red grouper harvest shares
(landings plus regulatory discards) on vertical line gear trips during the 2005-14 data period. Av-
erage values are indicated by a rectangle; 25%-75% percentile values are indicated by the vertical
whiskers. The dashed vertical demarcation shows the start of the Grouper/Tilefish IFQ program
which began in January, 2010.
The catch composition shown in the figure is informative of the true structure of the reef fish
harvest technology. Notice first that the 25%-75% range in red grouper harvest shares indicate
considerable heterogeneity within and across quarters. If the technology satisfied the fixed output
17The problem of constructing meaningful aggregates for factors of production and nonlinearity in effort-harvest rela-
tionships are problems that can be addressed with better data and consistent methods of aggregation (see Squires, 1987).
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Figure 1: Red Grouper Harvest shares: 2005-14.
proportions assumption, and all fishermen in the FL-North region fish a common reef fish stock,
the share of red grouper in trip catch would be constant. The heterogeneity shown in the figure,
although not conclusive, does not support the fixed output proportions assumption. It is possible the
reef fish stock abundance is spatially heterogeneous within the FL-North region or that individual
fishermen target different species mixes. As noted, unobservability of the reef fish stock precludes
a formal test of competing hypotheses regarding the structure of the multiple-species technology.
A second observation is the cyclical pattern shown during the pre-IFQ regulation, which dis-
appears when the quota regulation is introduced. Low red grouper harvest share quarters during
2005-09 coincide with grouper fishery closures which were used to limit fleet catch and meet con-
servation goals. The observed pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that reef fish fishermen
avoided grouper species and targeting other species (under presumably the same stock conditions)
when grouper landings were prohibited. This supports a flexible costly targeting specification for
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the reef fish technology. Observed patterns in the harvest mix of other reef fish species across other
regions and gear types find similar support. To conserve space these results are not reported.
Implementation
In the absence of consistently estimated regional stock transition equations,18 equation (4b), and
cost-stock effects, the impacts of changing stock conditions, in terms of absolute abundance, species
mix and spatial migration, on fishing costs and thus equilibrium fishing outcomes are unknowable.
To move forward additional assumptions are needed. The approach I follow here is to use the two
calibrated model components to simulate equilibrium outcomes that can be viewed as credible given
the stock conditions during the 2005-14 data period. In other words, an evaluation of management
scenarios in which reef fish stock abundance is maintained near 2005-14 levels can provide im-
portant and reliable management advice. It should be emphasized that because there is no way to
evaluate bias due to a no-stock-change assumption, the results that follow are interpreted with some
caution.
The dimension of the state space in the most general application to the GOM reef fish fishery is
14, with 8 reef fish species and 6 species’ quotas (recall that landings of vermilion snapper and the
Other species group are not included under the regulation).
Ignoring stock dynamics allows me to reduce the dimension of the state space further to 6. I
simplify the model and drop reef fish species in regions where they have a particularly small role
in landings and revenue. Table 3 in the appendix reports average quarterly landings and revenues
during 2014 which is the year of my baseline calibration. Shallow water groupers account for
roughly 1% of landings and revenue in the WEST region. Red and vermilion snapper make up
2%-3% of landings and revenue in FL-South. Other shallow water groupers make up 2% or less of
landings and revenues in all regions. I drop shallow water groupers in the WEST, red and vermilion
snapper in FL-South, and other shallow water groupers in all regions. For these species and regions
I fix quarterly landings to their 2014 average quarterly values (see table 3).
18Growth and migration patterns of GOM reef fish species can in principle be calibrated and summarized with surplus
stock production models. Attempts to calibrate a stock transition model and initial stock abundance did not produce
results that were deemed sufficient for credible bioeconomic simulation.
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Chebychev polynomial interpolation is used to approximate v(X,Q|s) for each s ∈ S and for a
representative quarter (see Judd, 1998; Miranda and Fackler, 2002). I assume that dockside demand
conditions and factor input prices are constant across quarters. Under these assumptions, and with
not stock effects in the model, the annual quota will be distributed equally across quarters. This sim-
plification allows me to solve the quota allocation problem, equation (3), for a single representative
quarter.19
5 Results
Table 2 reports quarterly and regional equilibrium quota utilization, harvesting costs, fishing sector
profits (quota rent), consumer surplus, and fishery-wide quota trading prices under four management
scenarios. Scenario 1 sets annual red snapper, grouper and tilefish quotas and economic conditions
(fish demand and factor input prices) equal to their counterparts in my 2014 data. Scenario 2 main-
tains 2014 economic conditions but reduces the red and gag grouper quota by 25% relative to 2014
levels. Scenario 3 maintains 2014 quotas and economic conditions but simulates a fishery closure.
The scenario is intended to approximate the 2010-11 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster. The
disaster led authorities to close large portions the AL-MS subregion to commercial fishing. The
closures began in May 2010 and ended in March 2011. Regional landings of groupers and tilefish
dropped considerably during this period. Scenario 3 simulates the closure event by removing the
entire MS-AL region from the quota allocation problem in equation (3).
Finally, scenario 4 maintains 2104 snapper, grouper and tilefish quotas but changes a key eco-
nomic fundamental. I consider the effects of a 20% increase in the price of fuel, relative to the 2014
average fuel price. Note that studying changes in annual quotas requires that I solve the problem
in equation (3) under different quota constraints. Evaluating a change in an economic fundamental
requires re-approximation of the regional quota constrained value functions in equation (2) before
re-solving equation (3).
Scenario 1 results provide a check on the model’s ability to replicate outcomes observed in the
19Regional value functions are strictly concave in quota which ensures that maximized seasonal quota value involves
repeating quarterly production plans throughout the year.
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GOM reef fish fishery data. The results indicate that the annual red snapper quota of 5.054 m. lbs. in
2014 is binding with a positive equilibrium quota lease price of $0.485/lb. In actuality, 91.6% of the
2014 red snapper quota was landed in 2014. NMFS (2015) reports that average quota lease prices
during this period averaged $3.03 per pound. When I reduce the red snapper quota to the levels
observed during 2010-12 (on average, 3.402 m. lbs. per year) my model predicts an equilibrium red
snapper lease price of $2.838/lb., which is much closer to reported lease prices (NMFS, 2015).
Scenario 1 predicts WEST region red snapper landings and quota use at 731.514 pounds per
quarter. Actual 2014 WEST region quarterly landings of red snapper averaged roughly 9% less at
666.119 pounds per quarter. If I adjust for the fact that 0.916% of the fishery wide red snapper quota
was utilized in 2014, my model predicts that 57.9% of the red snapper quota will be fished in the
WEST where in actuality 57.3% of the red snapper was landed in the WEST region in 2014.
Scenario 1 results indicate that the West region harvesting activity is, in equilibrium, organized
into 119 fishing trips per quarter. The GOM data indicate that, on average, 659.250 WEST region
trips were taken per quarter in 2014. This discrepancy is not unexpected. The solution to the
problem in (3) organizes the reef fish harvest into fully cost efficient representative fishing trips,
which include larger per trip harvest than observed in the data (there is also considerable variation
in per-trip harvest among actual vessels). Whereas the model assumes equilibrium representative
trips fully exploit the available returns to size in harvest, actual reef fish fishing the GOM does not
achieve this standard. Per-trip harvests/landings in the range predicted by the model are observed in
the 2014 GOM reef fish data.
Comparison of the scenario 1 predictions with their observed counterparts in 2014 finds similar-
ities but also discrepancies. The results highlight the challenges of calibrating models of complex
coupled human natural systems. Results that follow should be interpreted in light of these calibra-
tion limitations.
Management scenario 1 outcomes indicate slack annual quotas for red and gag grouper and
binding quotas for the remaining species. As required, equilibrium quota lease prices are zero
(positive) when the species-specific annual quota is slack (binding). Scenario 2 results indicated
binding quotas and positive quota prices for all species; the red grouper quota lease price rises to
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$0.84/lb. and the gag grouper quota leases to $ 1.53/lb. under the reduced grouper quotas.
The results highlight the role of quota shadow prices for predicting fishing behavior. Equilib-
rium quota allocation across regions and quarters is determined by the marginal profit from landing
a unit of quota, which is derived as the virtual landings price, pi − ri, less the species-specific
marginal harvest cost. Note that marginal costs depend on and must be evaluated at the equilibrium
trip-level harvest vector. Under the flexible costly targeting technology, a change in the annual quota
for a single reef fish species can cause adjustments to all endogenous variables of the model. Results
in table 2, for example, indicate that quota utilization, quarterly trips, the trip level mix of harvested
species and landings, quota rent, consumer surplus, and the quota lease prices are all impacted by a
reduction in red and gag quotas (management scenario 2).
Additional red and gag grouper quota scenarios were examined. The results are not reported
to save space. This analysis finds that modest reductions in the red and gag grouper quotas, in the
range of 5% - 10% declines relative to 2014 quotas, and quota increases above 2014 levels have no
effect on equilibrium outcomes. The reason is that for modest quota adjustments both red and gag
quotas remain slack and therefore predicted equilibrium outcomes are unchanged. On the contrary,
marginal adjustments to binding species quotas result in changes to all endogenous variables.
Comparison of the results of scenario 3 with the baseline results yields several insights. First,
a closure of the AL-MS region loosens quota constraints in the remaining open regions. Scenario
3 results show that only the Tilefish quota binds when the AL-MS region is closed. Quarterly red
snapper quota use in the WEST GOM increases from 731,514 to 795,842 pounds. The number
of fishing trips, total cost, quota rent, and consumer surplus all increase in the WEST, FL-North,
and FL-South. Interestingly, tilefish quota use declines in the WEST but increases in FL-North and
FL-South. This finding suggests differences in cost complementarity across regions. The results
indicate that cost complementarity between tilefish and other reef fish species is stronger in FL-
North and FL-South than in the WEST. As a result, the model predicts a redistribution of Tilefish
quota away from the WEST and toward the two Florida regions when the AL-MS region is closed
to fishing.
Comparing the scenario 4 results with baseline values finds not surprisingly that trips taken,
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quota rent, and consumer surplus, are lower when fuel prices increase. Equilibrium quota lease
prices decline for red snapper, tilefish and DW grouper species, and remain at $0/lb. for the slack
quota species, red and gag grouper. Declines in quota utilization relative to the baseline are indi-
cated across most species and regions, with the magnitudes of these changes varying regionally.
Interestingly, the model predicts that DW grouper quota is redistributed from the WEST region to
the AL-MS, FL-North, and FL-South regions of the fishery when fuel prices rise. This result is
explained by regional differences in the harvest technology. As noted above, the fuel price-cost
elasticity in the WEST region is more than twice that of other regions. The result is a redistribution
of quota to the now relatively lower cost regions.
It should be emphasized that the changes in equilibrium outcomes reported in table 2 derive
from changes in regulations and economic fundamentals, i.e., stock conditions do not vary in the
model. Yet, non-trivial changes in reef fish targeting at the trip level are indicated. Under a fixed
output proportions harvest technology, changes in the harvest mix are assumed to derive exclusively
from changes in stock abundance. If the fixed output proportions assumption is imposed, when in
fact the technology is flexible as assumed here, the targeting adjustments in table 2 will be missed.
Zero reef fish discarding is predicted under all scenarios considered in table 2. Under a flexible
technology, discarding fish at sea is part of a profit maximizing plan under quite special stock, quota,
and economic conditions. Note that when discarding fish due to insufficient quota, trip revenue
derives only from non-quota-constrained species. This revenue must be sufficient to compensate
for the costs of harvesting both discarded and retained species. Further examination of equilibrium
outcomes (not reported to save space) find that positive discards arise when quotas for relative high
price and low marginal cost species are set to particularly low levels, while remaining reef fish
quotas are maintained at levels are sufficient to maintain a profitable fishing trip. If regulators avoid
setting quotas in the discard set as defined in Singh and Weninger (2009), over-quota discards do
not arise in the model.
An exercise of further contrasting the predicted outcomes in table 2 with those obtained under
a standard fishery sector model was not informative. Suppose a model of multiple me´tiers under a
fixed output proportions harvest technology is specified for GOM reef fish. Implementation would
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require rules governing the allocation of regional fishing effort (which would also require definition
and measurement), rules to determine discards when one or more reef fish species quotas bind (e.g.,
Hoff et al., 2010; Ulrich, et al., 2017). Unless quota prices are derived endogenously, effort allo-
cations would follow ad hoc rules as functions of revenue or profit differentials that are calculated
from the wrong prices, i.e., quota shadow prices would be absent from the model. Me´tier-specific
cathabilities would remain fixed under simulated management and economic scenarios. Additional
assumptions for constraints on annual effort (days at sea), vessel capital investments, may also be
required (e.g., Sølgaard Andersen et al., 2010). Without sound basis to select among the large set
of candidate assumptions, all of which would impact model predictions, comparison of competing
model predictions, do not provide further insight.
6 Conclusion
Fisheries sector models are often used within complex ecosystem process models to inform the
design of ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) policy. For reasons of simplicity and
to maintain model tractability, standard practice maintains restrictive assumptions for the structure
of multiple-species fishing technologies and ad hoc rules to predict fishing behavior and fisheries-
ecosystem interaction. Regulatory shadow prices that emerge in decentralized and regulated pro-
duction settings are ignored. Due to a pervasive empirical identification problem in fisheries bioe-
conomic models, empirically unverifiable assumptions are used to represent the fisheries sector re-
sponse to changing stock conditions. Fishing sector models that invoke these assumptions/methods
score low on criteria of ecological, internal, and external validity. EBFM policy designs that derive
from such models are unlikely to meet EBFM goals.
This paper proposes a model of rational, flexible multiple-species fishing under an individual
transferable quota regulation as an alternative. An application to the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) com-
mercial reef fish fishery demonstrates the improved ecological validity. The application further
highlights empirical challenges in calibrating fisheries bioeconomic models, and demonstrates the
types of policy questions that can and cannot be quantified using currently available data and calibra-
tion methods. Simulations are presented that predict equilibrium outcomes of interest to managers
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and fishery stakeholders under varying annual reef fish quotas, in a scenario that replicates a re-
gional fishery closure, and under changing economic fundamentals (fuel prices). Results inform
and quantify bias that may obtain from restrictive standard fishery models.
Deriving rational expectations equilibrium outcomes in managed marine ecosystems is not with-
out limitation; the proposed methodology is data intensive and computationally demanding. The
state space that can be accommodated using numerical recursive dynamic programming methods
limit model generality, e.g., the number of fish species included in the application was reduced.
Managers and stakeholders should nonetheless be aware of the role of simplifying assumptions
in bioeconomic simulation exercises. New empirical methods and perhaps enhanced fisheries data
collection may allow consistent estimation of the stock-effect structural property of commercial
fishing technologies. Until such estimates are available, a “stock-constant” simulation such as the on
presented in this paper offers a defensible policy evaluation tool. Absent the stock-effect component,
however, long-term prediction of fisheries sector outcomes under changing stock conditions will
lack external validity and are likely to mislead EBFM.
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7 Appendix
7.0.1 Descriptive statistics
39
Scenario 1: 2014 Quotas (Baseline Calibration)
WEST AL-MS FL-N FL-S Total (m.) Util. ri
Red Snap. 731.514 398.129 120.416 13.441∗ 1.264 1.000 $0.487
Red Group. 5.346∗ 79.841 969.176 235.497 1.407 0.916 0.000
Gag Group. 2.938∗ 40.224 146.070 15.779 0.209 0.982 0.000
DW Group. 65.442 51.955 107.934 52.170 0.278 1.000 0.561
Tilefish 90.755 35.575 8.065 11.105 0.145 1.000 1.190
Trips 119 187 655 633 1,594
Cost ($ m.) 0.770 0.908 2.273 1.203 5.154
Rent ($ m.) 4.735 2.702 3.996 2.179 13.612
Cons. Surp. ($ m.) 2.132 1.234 1.948 1.072 6.386
Scenario 2: 25% Decline in Red and Gag Grouper Quotas
WEST AL-MS FL-N FL-S Total (m.) Util. ri
Red Snap. 731.676 398.113 120.270 13.441∗ 1.264 1.000 0.485
Red Group. 5.346∗ 62.562 797.122 191.932 1.057 1.000 0.840
Gag Group. 2.938∗ 29.974 112.585 11.800 0.157 1.000 1.530
DW Group. 65.504 52.003 107.698 52.296 0.278 1.000 1.558
Tilefish 90.746 35.580 8.002 11.172 0.145 1.000 1.190
Trips 119 181 568 616 1,484
Cost ($ m.) 0.770 0.877 1.981 1.169 4.797
Rent ($ m.) 4.735 2.688 3.898 2.162 18.280
Cons. Surp. ($ m.) 2.133 1.178 1.478 0.973 5.762
Scenario 3: AL-MS Region Closure (Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill)
WEST AL-MS FL-N FL-S Total (m.) Util. ri
Red Snap. 795.842 0.000 134.647 13.441∗ 0.944 0.744 0.000
Red Group. 5.346∗ 0.000 969.654 235.444 1.210 0.859 0.000
Gag Group. 2.938∗ 0.000 145.993 15.217 0.164 0.783 0.000
DW Group. 76.555 0.000 121.343 60.048 0.258 0.930 0.000
Tilefish: 115.433 0.000 13.326 16.741 0.145 1.000 0.487
Trips 127 0.000 662 639 1,428
Cost ($ m.) 0.821 0.000 2.295 1.213 4.329
Rent ($ m.) 4.770 0.000 4.006 2.186 10.962
Cons. Surp. ($ m.) 2.365 0.000 2.012 1.093 5.470
Scenario 4: 2014 Quota, 20$ Increase in Fuel Prices
WEST AL-MS FL-N FL-S Total (m.) Util. ri
Red Snap. 731.172 398.527 120.359 13.441∗ 1.264 1.000 $0.474
Red Group. 5.346∗ 77.465 953.910 234.126 1.271 0.903 0.000
Gag Group. 2.938∗ 39.846 145.579 15.190 0.204 0.975 0.000
DW Group. 61.291 53.180 110.134 52.896 0.278 1.000 0.435
Tilefish 89.970 36.030 8.183 11.318 0.145 1.000 1.133
Trips 118 183 646 622 1,569
Cost ($ m.) 0.858 0.937 2.346 1.257 5.398
Rent ($ m.) 4.636 2.655 3.887 2.102 13.280
Cons. Surp. ($ m.) 2.109 1.216 1.899 1.037 6.261
Table 2: Equilibrium Quota Allocation by Species and Region. Scenario 1 is for 2014
economic conditions and annual quotas: red snapper quota is 5.054 m. lbs.; red grouper quota is 5.630
m. lbs.; gag grouper quota is 0.835 m. lbs.; OSW grouper quota is 0.523 m. lbs.; DW grouper quota is
1.110 m. lbs.; Tilefish quota is 0.582 m. lbs. Scenario 2 increases red and gag grouper quotas 25% above
2014 levels. Scenario 3 closes the AL-MS region. Scenario 4 reports results under 2014 quotas and a 20%
increase in fuel prices above 2014 levels. Trips have been rounded to the nearest integer. Total is the sum
of regional pounds in millions. Costs, quota rent, and consumer surplus is reported in millions of $2014.
An asterisk indicates a species for which landings are held at 2014 levels.
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Region 1: WEST
R. Snap. V. Snap. R. Grp. Gag Grp. SW Grp. DW Grp. T. Fish Other Sp.
Landings 666.12 121.86 5.35 2.94 7.44 76.64 95.55 326.13
Share 0.55 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.21
Revenue 3,147.36 382.48 19.97 13.59 30.81 345.57 291.72 678.31
Share 0.66 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.13
Price 4.73 3.16 3.74 4.62 4.14 4.52 2.99 2.08
Region 2: Al-MS
R. Snap. V. Snap. R. Grp. Gag Grp. SW Grp. DW Grp. T. Fish Other
Landings 364.88 189.65 78.36 28.84 9.99 43.27 36.32 260.92
Share 0.37 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.25
Revenue 1,497.19 569.10 298.88 142.58 46.37 189.84 104.96 465.22
Share 0.45 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.14
Price 4.08 3.02 3.81 4.93 4.65 4.38 2.89 1.71
Region 3: FL-North
R. Snap. V. Snap. R. Grp. Gag Grp. SW Grp. DW Grp. T. Fish Other
Landings 112.71 34.40 1,018.67 94.08 26.74 89.17 14.13 223.80
Share 0.07 0.02 0.63 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.14
Revenue 490.94 102.77 3,850.55 466.42 122.91 389.66 31.41 454.83
Share 0.08 0.02 0.65 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.08
Price 4.35 3.00 3.78 4.95 4.58 4.41 2.15 2.04
Region 4: FL-South
R. Snap. V. Snap. R. Grp. Gag Grp. SW Grp. DW Grp. T. Fish Other
Landings 13.44 1.11 207.66 9.60 11.18 42.88 14.88 468.28
Share 0.02 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.57
Revenue 59.19 3.42 779.91 47.63 52.73 183.78 29.79 1,174.73
Share 0.03 0.00 0.34 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.48
Price 4.46 3.00 3.77 4.95 4.72 4.29 2.11 2.65
All Regions
R. Snap. V. Snap. R. Grp. Gag Grp. SW Grp. DW Grp. T. Fish Other
Landings 4,628.58 1,388.12 5,240.16 541.81 221.37 1,007.88 643.50 5,116.48
Share 0.25 0.07 0.28 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.27
Revenue 20,778.73 4,231.09 19,797.26 2,680.90 1,011.25 4,435.39 1,831.54 11,092.37
Share 0.32 0.06 0.30 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.17
Price 4.41 3.05 3.76 4.86 4.52 4.40 2.54 2.12
Table 3: Quarterly Average Landings, Revenue, and Dockside Price by
Species, 2014. Landings are reported in thousands of pounds, revenues in
thousands of 2014 dollars, and dockside prices in 2014 dollars.
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